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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERA S.KING, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
— vs. — 
F. F. HINTZE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 24, 1950 the plantiff and appellee, Vera S. 
King, and one Edwin G. Kidder (herein designated 
Assignors) and the defendant and appellant, F. F. 
Hintze, (herein designated Assignee) entered into a writ-
ten contract which is the basis of this action. The said 
contract is plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and was formally ad-
mitted in evidence (R. 2, 296). By this contract the 
Assignee agreed: 
1. To organize a corporation under the laws of the 
State of Nevada to be capitalized for $500,000.00 divided 
into 5,000,000 shares of the par value of ten cents each, 
Case No. 
8071 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of which amount 2,490,000 shares were to remain in the 
company treasury to be sold, exchanged or otherwise dis-
posed of at such times and for such purposes as the 
Board of Directors shall determine. All shares were to 
be fully paid and non-assessable. 
2. To execute and deliver to the corporation to be 
organized by Assignee a quit claim deed conveying all of 
Assignee's right, title, claim and interest in and to 13 
certain unpatented lode mining claims situated in White 
Pine County, Nevada, designated as Dolomite Nos. 1 to 
12, inclusive, and Gap lode mining claim. 
3. To transfer and deliver to the Assignors 1,250,-
000 shares of the capital stock of said mining corporation 
to be organized by the Assignee in payment of a certain 
lease and option and certain unpatented lode mining 
claims hereinafter described. 
4. To take possession of the mining claims des-
cribed in the agreement and all appurtenances thereto 
and within thirty days commence actual mining opera-
tions and perform the work requirements of the lease 
and option hereinafter described necessary to perpetuate 
same and maintain same in good standing. 
By this contract the Assignors: 
1. Agreed to assign to the Assignee (and by said 
agreement the Assignors did assign to the Assignee) all 
of the right, title and interest of the Assignors in and to 
a certain mining lease and option dated November 1, 
1948, wherein William Isaacs and Otto Isaacs did lease 
and let unto Edwin Gr. Kidder (one of the Assignors), 
2 
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certain lode mining claims situate in White Pine Mining 
District, White Pine County, Nevada. 
2. Agreed to execute and deliver to the Assignee 
or to the company to be organized by him a quit claim 
deed conveying all of the right, title, claim and interest 
of the Assignors in and to certain lode mining claims 
situate in White Pine County, Nevada, and described as 
follows: 
King Nos. 1 to 7, inclusive, unpatented lode min-
ing claims 
Kidder-King Nos. 1 to 8, inclusive, unpatented 
lode mining claims 
Helena lode unpatented mining claim 
Mid-Dolomite Nos. 7 and 8 unpatented lode min-
ing claims 
Charter Oak patented lode mining claim, survey 
No. 52-86, Patent No. 23319 
An undivided ys interest in the Monitor Eeindeer 
patented lode mining claim, Survey No. 127, 
Patent No. 23319. 
3. Granted to the Assignee the exclusive right and 
option for a period of sixty days to purchase from 
Assignors 250,000 shares of the capital stock of the corpo-
ration, which Assignors were to receive for a total pur-
chase price of $20,000.00. 
4. Warranted that there were no outstanding debts 
or liens against the property to be conveyed by the 
Assignors and the said mining lease and option, and that 
the same are free and clear of debts and claims of any 
kind, and should any claims arise out of operation of 
3 
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claims in the past the Assignors will hold the Assignee 
harmless of all liabilities and expense of litigation which 
may arise out of same. 
5. Gave immediate possession of said mining claims 
to Assignee. 
6. Allowed Assignee, as consideration for his cove-
nants in the agreement and for the assignment of mining 
claims claimed to be ow^ed by Assignors, to issue to him-
self 2,510,000 shares (including the 1,250,000 shares to 
be transferred to Assignors) of the capital stock of the 
corporation to be organized by him. 
The Assignee did not organize the corporation con-
templated by the aforesaid agreement (B. 257). 
The Assignor King (plaintiff and appellee) insti-
tuted and prosecuted this action against the Assignee 
Hintze (defendant and appellant) to secure judgment 
awarding said Assignor, King, damages for Assignee's 
breach of contract arising out of his failure to organize 
the corporation contemplated by the agreement. Although 
Edwin Gr. Kidder was named a party defendant, he was 
never served with process of court (B. 56). Kidder died 
December 20, 1952 (B. 22). The motion of the Assignee 
(defendant and appellant) to make Kidder's personal 
representative a party to the action (E. 21-24) was denied 
by the trial court (E. 25, 26). The trial was held on May 
18, 19, 20, 1953, before a jury, which returned a verdict 
in favor of Assignor King (plaintiff and appellee) for 
nominal damages in the sum of six cents, and general 
damages in the sum of $4500.00 (E. 284). The motion of 
the Assignee Hintze (defendant and appellant) for judg-
4 
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ment notwithstanding verdict (E. 286, 287) was denied 
(E. 288). Thereupon said defendant and appellant per-
fected his appeal to the Supreme Court from said judg-
ment (E. 289-295, 297). 
The trial court instructed the jury that as a matter 
of law the defendant and appellant Hintze had breached 
the contract above described and had offered no evidence 
constituting a defense and that plaintiff and appellee 
was entitled as a matter of law to nominal damages. 
(Instruction No. 1; E. 270, 271). There was then sub-
mitted to the jury under four separate instructions the 
question as to whether or not plaintiff and appellee was 
entitled to general damages, and if so, the amount of 
same (Instructions 2, 3, 4, 5; E. 272-274). 
As a defense to the cause of action asserted against 
him by plaintiff and appellee King, the defendant and 
appellant, Hintze, specifically set forth in his amended 
answer (E. 28-33) his contention that the unpatented 
lode mining claims, King Nos. 1 to 7, Kidder-King Nos. 
1 to 8, Helena and Mid-Dolomite claims Nos. 7 and 8, 
never had a legal existence at any time, and particularly 
did not exist on June 24, 1950, the date upon which 
Exhibit 2 was executed. Hintze further alleged in his 
amended answer that neither the aforesaid Kidder nor 
the plaintiff and appellee King had any right, title, claim 
or interest in and to said unpatented lode mining claims 
at the time of execution of the contract above described 
on June 24, 1950, and that at no time either before or 
after June 24, 1950 did said Kidder and King hold any 
right, title, claim or interest in and to said unpatented 
5 
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lode mining claims (E. 30). Said Hintze further alleged 
that the non-existence of said claims and their fictitious 
nature became known to him long after June 24, 1950 
and only when he attempted to organize a corporation 
which was to own and operate said claims (R. 30, 31). 
On this premise, Hintze asserted that it was impossible 
for Kidder and King to convey to him or to the company 
which he undertook to form the said unpatented lode 
mining claims and that such failure and inability of Kid-
der and King constituted a major and material breach 
of the contract dated June 24, 150 by plaintiff and appel-
lee King, and absolved and discharged him from the 
duty of organizing the corporation contemplated by said 
contract (R. 31). The trial court by its Instruction No. 
1 (R. 270, 271), directed the jury that the defendant and 
appellant Hintze had failed to establish his defense. The 
fundamental question on this appeal is whether or not 
the trial court committed error on this issue. 
The defendant and appellant Hintze introduced evi-
dence as to the requirements of the laws of the State of 
Nevada with respect to the location of lode mining claims 
in that state. The following statutory provisions were 
operative at the time the locations of the King Nos. 1 to 
7, Kidder-King Nos. 1 to 8, Helena, Mid-Dolomite Nos. 
7 and 8, were made. The quotations are from Hillyers 
Comp. Laws of Nevada, 1929: 
Sec. 1563: 
"The location and transfers of mining claims 
heretofore made shall be established and proved 
in contestation before courts, by the local rules, 
regulations, or customs of the miners in the sev-
6 
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eral mining districts of the territory in which such 
location and transfers were made." (K. 159) 
Sec. 4120: 
"Any person who is a citizen of the United 
States, or who has declared his intention to be-
come such, who discovers a vein or lode, may 
locate lode mining claim thereon by defining the 
boundaries of the claim in the manner and within 
the time hereinafter prescribed, and by erecting 
or constructing at the point of such discovery a 
monument of the size and character of any of the 
several monuments prescribed in section 2 of this 
act and by posting in or upon such discovery 
monument a notice of such location, which must 
contain: First — The name of the claim; Second 
— The name of the locator or locators; Third — 
the date of the location; Fourth — The number of 
linear feet claimed in the length along the course 
of the vein, each way from the point of discovery, 
with the width claimed on each side of the center 
of the vein and the general course of the lode or 
vein, as near as may be." (R. 160-161) 
Sec. 4121: 
"The locator of the lode mining claim must 
sink a discovery shaft upon the claim located four 
feet by six feet to the depth of at least ten feet 
from the lowest part of the rim of such shaft at 
the surface, or deeper, if necessary to show by 
such work a lode deposit of mineral in place; a 
cut or crosscut or tunnel which cuts a lode at a 
depth of ten feet or an open cut along the said 
ledge or lode, equivalent in size to a shaft four 
feet by six feet by ten feet deep, is equivalent to 
a discovery shaft. The locator must define the 
boundaries of his claim by removing the top of a 
tree (having a diameter of not less than four 
7 
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inches) not less than three feet above the ground, 
and blazing and marking the same, or by a rock in 
place, capping such rock with smaller stones, such 
rock and stones to have a height of not less than 
three feet, or by setting a post or stone one at 
each corner and one at the center of each side 
line. When a post is used, it must be at least four 
inches in diameter by four and one-half feet in 
length set one foot in the ground. When it is 
practically impossible, on account of bedrock or 
precipitous ground, to sink such posts, they may 
be placed in a mound of earth or stones, or where 
the proper placing of such posts or other monu-
ments is impracticable or dangerous to life or 
limb, it shall be lawful to place such posts or 
monuments at the nearest point properly marked 
to designate its right place. When a stone is used 
(not a rock in place) it must be not less than six 
inches in diameter and eighteen inches in length 
set two-thirds of its length in the top of a mount 
of earth or stone, four feet in diameter and two 
and one-half feet in height. All trees, posts or 
rocks used as monuments, when not four feet in 
diameter at the base, shall be surrounded by a 
mound of earth or stone four feet in diameter by 
two feet in height, which trees, posts, stones or 
rock monuments must be so marked as to desig-
nate the corners of the claim located; provided, 
however, that the locator of a mining claim shall 
within twenty days from the date of posting the 
notice of location define the boundaries of said 
claim by placing at each corner and at the center 
of each side line one of the hereinbefore described 
monuments, and shall within ninety days of the 
date of posting said location notice perform the 
location work hereinbefore prescribed." (E. 161, 
162) 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Sec. 4122: 
"Any locator or locators of a mining claim, 
after having established the boundaries of said 
claims, and after having complied with the pro-
visions of this act with reference to the establish-
ment of such boundaries, may file with the dis-
trict mining recorder a notice of location, setting 
forth the name given to the lode or vein, the num-
ber of linear feet claimed in length along the 
course of the vein, the date of location, the date on 
which the boundaries of the "claim were com-
pleted, and the name of the locator or locators. 
Should any claim be located in any section or ter-
ritory where no district has been as yet formed, 
or where there is no district recorder, the locator 
or locators of such claims may file with the county 
recorder, notice of location as set forth above, and 
said notice of location will be prima facie evidence 
in all courts of justice of the first location of said 
lode or vein. Within ninety days of the date of 
posting the location notice upon the claim the 
locator shall record his claim with the mining 
district recorder and the county recorder of the 
mining district or county in which such claim is 
situated by location certificate which must con-
tain : Firs t — The name of the lode or vein; Sec-
ond — The name of the locator or locators; Third 
— The date of the location and such description 
of the location of said claim, with reference to 
some natural object or permanent monument, as 
will identify the claim; Fourth — The number of 
linear feet claimed in length along the course of 
the vein each way from the point of discovery, 
with the width on each side of the center of the 
vein, and the general course of the lode or vein 
as near as may be; Fifth — The dimensions and 
locations of the discovery shaft or its equivalent, 
sunk upon the claim; Sixth — The location and 
9 
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description of each corner, with the markings 
thereon. Any record of the location of a lode min-
ing claim which shall not contain all the require-
ments named in this section shall be void. All 
records of lode or placer mining claims, millsites 
or tunnel rights heretofore made by any recorder 
of any mining district or any county recorder are 
hereby declared to be valid and to have the same 
force and effect as records made in pursuance of 
the provisions of this act. And any such record, 
or a copy thereof duly verified by a mining 
recorder or duly certified by a county recorder 
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein 
stated." (R, 163,164) 
The mining claims were located for Kidder and King 
in the autumn of 1949 (R. 51, 124) by an engineer named 
Casselli who lived in Ely, Nevada (R. 52). Kidder had 
been employed by Reynolds (who was obviously a pro-
moter) to do this work. The location work consisted 
of driving location posts measuring 4 x 4 inches or 
4 x 6 inches, into the ground or supporting them with a 
pile of stone where the earth was too firm and could not 
be penetrated. On these location posts were nailed cans 
in which were placed the location notices (R. 54, 124, 
126). A witness for Mrs. King (Reynolds) asserted that 
the claims were "interlaced with ore showings." (R. 125). 
There was no location work done on the claims — "no 
shaft sunk, no digging." (R, 125, 126, 128). Nothing was 
done except placing the location stakes or monuments 
(R. 126). No notice of location was ever recorded either 
in the office of the Recorder of the White Pine Mining 
District or White Pine County, Nevada (R. 126). Casselli 
was employed by Reynolds on behalf of Kidder and King 
10 
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only to erect the discovery stakes or posts and to place 
the notices in the cans which were affixed to the stakes 
(R. 127). 
The unpatented lode mining claims were never con-
veyed by Kidder and the plaintiff and appellee, King, 
to Hintze, the defendant and appellant, or to any com-
pany organized by Hintze (R. 250) although shortly 
before Kidder's death he delivered to Hintze a file con-
taining correspondence in regard to the transaction 
involved in this action (R. 253). Among the papers was 
a deed (Ex. 8, R. 258) which had been signed by Kidder, 
(R. 251) but not by King, wherein Hamilton Silver 
Mines, Inc. was grantee. This instrument described Mid-
Dolomite Nos. 7 and 8, Helena, Charter Oak and Monitor 
Reindeer, but did not describe the Kidder-King and King 
claims (R. 254). 
(Special Note: The alleged unpatented mining 
claims known and designated as King Nos. 1 to 7, Kidder-
King Nos. 1 to 8, Helena and Mid-Dolomite Nos. 7 and 8, 
will be for convenience hereinafter be designated as the 
Kidder-King claims.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ALLEGED KIDDER-KING UNPATENTED MIN-
ING CLAIMS WERE MERE FICTIONS ON JUNE 24,1950. 
THEY HAD NO LEGAL EXISTENCE AND AS A CON-
SEQUENCE THE PLAINTIFF HAD NO RIGHT, TITLE, 
CLAIM OR INTEREST IN AND TO THE SAME. 
1. The location of the Kidder-King claims was not dis-
tinctly marked on the ground so that their bounda-
ries could be readily traced, as required by 30 
11 
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U.S.C-A., 28, (R.S. 2324). 
The evidence clearly establishes the fact that the 
Kidder-King claims were located in the autumn of 1949 
by an engineer named Casselli, who was employed by 
Reynolds to do this work. At this time Casselli simply 
erected location posts and nailed cans thereto in which 
were placed the location notices. Reynolds in his testi-
mony makes it clear that nothing was done except plac-
ing these location stakes or monuments. There was no 
effort made to place markers in the ground so that the 
boundaries of each claim could be readily traced. This 
was manifestly the status of these so-called claims on 
June 24, 1950, the date on which the parties executed the 
contract which is the subject of this action. Over six 
months had elapsed between the date of posting the 
notices of location and the execution of the contract, as 
Reynolds repeatedly stated in his testimony that these 
locations were made in the autumn of 1949. The status 
of the law with respect to this situation is clear. 
Congress had definitely provided the method by 
which lode mining claims should be located. R.S. 2324 
(30 U.S.C.A. 28) provides in pertinent par t as follows: 
"The miners of each mining district may 
make regulations not in conflict with the laws of 
the United States, or with the laws of the State 
or Territory in which the district is situated, 
governing the location, manner of recording, 
amount of work necessary to hold possession of 
a mining claim, subject to the following require-
ments : The location must be distinctly marked on 
the ground so that its boundaries can be readily 
traced. * * " (Emphasis supplied) 
12 
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Lindley discusses this statute as follows: 
"The Eevised Statutes of the United States 
contain the mandatory provision, that the 'loca-
tion must be distinctly marked on the ground so 
that its boundaries can be readily traced.' There 
is no escape from this requirement. While it is 
possible that state statutes or local district regu-
lations may particularize as to the character of 
the marking, they cannot dispense with the neces-
sity for compliance with the law of congress. 
While, as we shall hereafter point out, time is 
allowed within which to establish the boundaries, 
until this is done the location is not complete. 
The requirement is an imperative and indispensa-
ble condition precedent to a valid location, and is 
not to be 'frittered away by construction.' After 
the discovery, it is the main act of original loca-
tion. This was the rule under the Spanish and 
Mexican law. The object of the law in requiring 
the location to be marked on the ground is to fix 
the claim, to prevent floating or swinging, so that 
those who in good faith are looking for unoc-
cupied ground in the vicinity of previous loca-
tions may be enabled to ascertain exactly what has 
been appropriated, in order to make their loca-
tions upon the residue. It also operates to deter-
mine the right of the claimant as between himself 
and the general r^vernment." (2 Lindley on 
Mines (3rd Ed.) , Sec. 371) 
"In order to prevent the swinging or floating 
of claims and to apprise other explorers of the 
amount of unappropriated ground still available, 
the Federal statutes declare that 'the location 
must be distinctly marked on the ground so that 
its boundaries can be readily traced;' and in many 
mining areas this somewhat cryptic enactment 
has been supplemented by miners' rules or state 
13 
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legislation, prescribing the methods to be followed 
and fixing a time for compliance. In other words, 
it is just as essential that the boundaries of a 
claim be duly marked as it is that a notice be 
posted, and it appears to be definitely settled that 
a failure to comply with this requirement nullifies 
the location and makes it inoperative to segregate 
the land included therein from the public domain 
— at least during the continuance of the default." 
(36 Am, Jur. Mines and Minerals, Sec. 89, page 
341) 
"One of the imperative requirements of the 
statute, an indispensable condition precedent of a 
valid location, is that it shall be 'distinctly raarked 
on the ground so that its boundaries can bo readily 
traced' (R. S. 2324)." {Gleeeson v. Martin White 
Mining Company, 13 Nev. 442, 35 Pac. St. R., 442 
at 456.) 
"That the staking of the surface boundaries 
of the claim has been required upon all surface 
locations made since May 10, 1872, has been 
repeatedly decided. * * These decisions are not 
made upon local statutes, but as the construction 
of 30 U.S.C.A., Sec. 28 (R.S. Sec, 2324); nor can 
we see how any other construction can be con-
tended for. It follows, therefore, that since May 
10, 1872, surface staking along the bounds of the 
claim has been required in all cases, without re-
gard to State, Territorial or District legislation 
requiring such staking. Such legislation, when it 
existed, has been to direct the details of the tak-
ing, but a sufficient staking has been required 
under the Act of Congress whether the local rule 
has been silent or outspoken on this point. * *" 
(Morrison's Mining Rights, 16th Ed., page 48) 
"It will be observed that the statute nowhere 
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requires that the boundaries be marked. The 
requirement is that the location be marked so the 
boundaries can be traced. We think that where 
the notice of location gives the length and breadth 
of the claim from the discovery monument, and 
three corners are properly marked, and the cen-
ters of both end lines are also properly marked, 
there ought to be no difficulty in tracing the entire 
boundary, under ordinary circumstances." (War-
nock v. DeWitt, 11 Utah 324, 40 P. 205. 
"And where a discovery of mineral has been 
made, and a proper location notice filed, then, if 
the boundaries are marked on the ground, before 
intervening rights have accrued, the claim will be 
valid. The locator, however, delays at his peril, 
since thereby he assumes the risk of intervening 
rights of third parties." (Emphasis supplied) 
(Brockbank v. Albion Min. Co., 29 Utah 367, 81 
P. 863) 
"But if the Portland notices were so posted, 
and the claims were not staked or monumented 
within 90 days thereafter, then we think the loca-
tions were not completed under the act of Con-
gress and the state statute, and, the land not hav-
ing been marked within that period, so that its 
boundaries could be traced, it was not segre-
gated from the public domain, although such post-
ing carried the right to define the boundaries 
within 90 days. The period for this purpose has 
since been shortened by an act of the legislature 
to 20 days. St. 1907, p.'419, c. 194." (Nash v. Mc-
Namara, 30 Nev. 114, 93 P. 405, 16 L.K.A. (N.S.) 
168) 
"The rule adopted in Nevada is that where 
the prior locator posts the requisite notice, and 
properly marks the boundaries of the claim within 
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the statutory period, the ground becomes segre-
gated from the public domain from the date of 
posting the notice, so that during the statutory 
period for perfecting the location the area em-
braced in the claim will not be open to location 
by others, or until after a failure to do the other 
work required to be done within such period." 
(Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper 
Co., 18 Wyo. 234,106 P. 673) 
"The discovery is manifestly the source of 
the title, and vests the discoverer with the prior 
right to complete his location. He could only lose 
this prior right to perfect his claim by a failure 
within a reasonable time to mark his location so 
that the boundaries could be traced upon the 
ground." (McCleary, et al. v. Broaddus, et aL, 14 
Cal.App. 60, 111 P. 125.) 
"As applied to the location in question, there 
were at least two essential facts required by Kev. 
St. U. S. Sec. 2320, 2324 (U. S. Comp. St, Sec. 
4615, 4620,) viz: (1) The discovery of mineral 
within the claim; and (2) the marking of the loca-
tion on the ground so that its boundaries may be 
readily traced. Lindley on Mines, Sec. 328. Until 
the requirements of law are complied with, a loca-
tion is not perfected. The decisive question in 
this case is whether the record establishes the fact 
of a valid location of the plaintiffs' mining claim, 
and, if so, as of what time." (Gibbons et al v. 
Frazier et al, 68 Utah 178, 249 P. 472.) 
"The authorities further hold, however, as 
plaintiff concedes, that where notice is properly 
posted, but the locator does not remain in posses-
sion of said claim or distinctly mark the same on 
the ground so that its boundaries can be readily 
traced, the location is invalid as against a subse-
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
quent locator who complies with the requirements 
of the statute. * * In other words, * * a party can 
show a right to the possession of a mining claim 
(when no patent has issued) only by showing an 
actual pedis possessio as against a mere wrong-
doer, or by showing a compliance with the require-
ments of law." {Be Witt v. Sides, 81 Cal. App. 
643, 254 P. 668.) 
"We see nothing in the case to justify a verdict, 
or decision, upon such general grounds as were 
stated by the Court. The Act of Congress in 
question provides (Sec, 2324, R. S.), that 'the loca-
tion must be distinctly marked on the ground, so 
that its boundaries can be readily traced/ Since 
the passage of that Act, a party can show a right 
to the possession of a mining claim (when no 
patent has been issued) only by showing an actual 
pedis possessio, as against a mere wrong-doer, 
or by showing a compliance with the requisites of 
the Act of Congress. There is no pretense of any 
actual possession of the whole claim other than by 
compliance with the Act. The true questions for 
decision, therefore, were: Which party had com-
plied with the requirements of the law, and was 
prior in time; not which, 'on the whole, had the 
better right.' " (Funk v. Sterrett, 20 Pac. St. Rep., 
(Cal.) at 614.) 
See also United States v. Sherman, 288 Fed. 497; 
Gelcich v. Moriarty; 53 Cal. 217, 18 Pac. St. Rep. 217; 
Eaton v. Norris, 131 Cal. 561, 63 P. 856. 
"Pedis Possessio. Lat. A foothold fan actual 
possession. To constitute adverse possession there 
must be pedis possessio, or a substantial in-
cloure." (Black's Law Bictionary, Third Edition, 
page 1343.) 
"Pedis Possessio or Possession Pedis. Actual 
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bona fide occupation; actual occupancy; actual 
possession; a foothold upon land accompanied 
with the real and effectual enjoyment of the 
estate, with the reception of its fruits, its rents, 
issues, and profits; occupancy in fact of the whole 
that is in possession; subjection to the will and 
control; substantial possession. Pedis possessio 
is usually evidenced by occupation, by a sub-
stantial inclosure, by cultivation, or by appropri-
ate use according the particular locality and 
quality of the property." (48 C. J., page 779) 
It is manifest that the locators of the Kidder-King 
claims made no attempt whatsoever to comply with the 
requirements of the federal statute concerning the mark-
ing of the claims on the ground so that the boundaries 
could be readily traced. Neither did these locators com-
ply or even attempt to comply with Sec. 4121, Comp. 
Laws of Nevada, 1929, which definitely charges the 
locator of a mining claim, within 20 days from the date 
of posting the notice of location, with the duty of defin-
ing the boundaries of said claim by placing at each cor-
ner and at the center of each side line a monument of 
the nature specifically defined by the statute. I t follows 
that the plaintiff agreed to convey her right, title and 
interest in claims which had no existence. It is no defense 
to this assertion to reply that Kidder and King could 
assert a possessory right against a third party tres-
passer for the reason that neither of them had an actual 
bona fide occupation of the claims within the meaning 
of the rule of law that gives a person in possession of 
a mining claim superior rights against a trespasser. All 
that Eeynolds caused Casselli to do, according to 
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Reynolds' statement, was to drive stakes in the ground 
and post notices of location thereon. Neither under the 
federal statute nor the law of Nevada did this constitute 
the location of a mining claim. Kidder and King had 
absolutely no shadow of title to the Kidder-King claims. 
They were non-existent; they were mere imaginings in 
the mind of Reynolds. 
Professor Lindley summarizes the situation pre-
sented in this case with respect to a locator who fails to 
comply with the statutory mandate requiring the mark-
ing of claims on the ground: 
"If he fails to comply with the law within the 
statutory period, his rights would thereafter be 
no greater than the rights of one in possession 
without discovery. He might protect his pedis 
possessio against forcible intrusion and hold it 
against one having no higher right; but he would 
be a mere occupant without color of title, and his 
possession must yield to anyone possessing the 
necessary qualifications, who enters peaceably 
and in good faith for the purpose of perfecting a 
valid location." (2 Lindley on Mines, (3rd Ed.) , 
page 794, Sec. 339) 
2, The locators of the Kidder-King claims failed to 
perform the location work within ninety days of the 
date of posting the location notice, as required by 
Section 4121, Volume 2, Nevada Compiled Laws, 
1929. 
Lindley writes thus of the provisions of the statute 
requiring a discovery shaft: 
"Of the precious metal-bearing states, Cali-
fornia and Utah have thus far enacted no laws 
requiring work of any character to be thus far 
enacted no laws requiring work of any character 
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to be performed as a prerequisite to the comple-
tion of a location; therefore, as to these states 
this article is inapplicable. 
"The states and territories hereinafter enum-
erated, however, have supplemented federal legis-
lation by requiring that certain preliminary 
development work in the nature of a discovery 
shaft, or its equivalent, shall be performed within 
a specified time as a condition precedent to the 
completion of a lode location. This legislation has 
been held to be valid. 
"As these state statutes are frequently impor-
tant factors necessary to be considered in con-
struing and applying decisions of the state courts, 
we will present an outline of the provisions found 
in the several states and territories upon this 
subject, taking the state of Colorado as a basis of 
comparison." (2 Lindley on Mines, (3rd Ed.), page 
795-6, Sec. 343) 
"Nevada: The posting of a notice is required, 
and before the expiration of ninety days there-
after the locator must sink a discovery shaft to a 
depth of at least ten feet from the lowest part of 
the rim of such shaft at the surface, or deeper if 
necessary, to show by such work a lode deposit of 
mineral in place. A cut, crosscut, or tunnel which 
cuts the lode at a depth of ten feet, or an open 
cut along the ledge or lode equivalent in size to a 
shaft four feet by six feet by ten feet deep is 
equivalent to a discovery shaft." (The ninety day 
provision has been changed to twenty days.) (2 
Lindley on Mines, (3rd Ed.), Sec. 343, page 779) 
"The time limit fixed in these statutes would 
seem to be mandatory. A discoverer could not 
extend it by simply renewing notices or changing 
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dates on the old notices, as against one making a 
location after the statutory period following the 
original discovery and notice had expired." (2 
Lindley on Mines, (3rd Ed.) , Sec. 344, page 805) 
"His original discovery will protect him in 
his possession during the statutory period, but if 
he permits that period to elapse, and fails to per-
form his development work and accomplish the 
results contemplated by law, his possession must 
yield to the next comer who succeeds by peaceable 
methods in initiating a right. As is said by Mr. 
Morrison, the neglect of the locator to comply 
with this requirement is equivalent to an abandon-
ment of the inchoate right given by discovery. 
The discovery has performed its office. The per-
fected location rests ultimately on the completed 
development work. This we understand to be the 
rule announced by Judge Hallett in the Adelaide-
Camp Bird case, and we are not aware of any 
adjudicated case to the contrary." (2 Lindley on 
Mines, (3rd Ed.) , Sec. 345, p. 807-8) 
"The requirement as to disclosing the vein, 
crevice, or deposit in place, which terms are legal 
equivalents, is unquestionably mandatory. What 
constitutes such a vein is to be determined by the 
rules announced by the courts in the adjudicated 
cases, which have been fully presented in preced-
ing articles, and need not here be repeated." (2 
Lindley on Mines, (3rd Ed.) , Sec. 346, p. 809-10) 
"Discovery and Discovery Shaft Distin-
guished. The fact of discovery is a fact of itself, 
to be totally disconnected from the idea of dis-
covery shaft. The discovery shaft is a part of 
the process of location, subsequent to discovery. 
If a lode, for instance, be discovered in a cross-cut 
run to operate some other known vein, or if a 
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prospect hole be dug on the outcrop of a lode, and 
no steps are taken to stake and record such hole, 
it becomes no more the property of the owner of 
the cross-cut, or of the party who dug the hole, 
than if he had never happened to strike it. 
Although he could have followed up the discovery 
by perfecting title, his neglect so to do is equiva-
lent to abandonment of the inchoate right given 
by discovery." {Morrison's Mining Rights, 16th 
Edition, p. 29) 
"Discovery Hold How Long? A discovery in 
Colorado, Wyoming, North and South Dakota, 
Montana and Oregon holds the claim for sixty 
days alloted to sink the discovery shaft. * * 
Alaska, Arizona,, New Mexico and Washington 
allow ninety days. Idaho allows sixty days, but 
claim must be staked within ten days after dis-
covery. Nevada allows ninety days from date of 
posting location notice, but requires the monu-
ments to be placed within twenty days from date 
of posting." (Morrison's Mining Rights, 16th 
Edition, p. 33) 
"The validity of the provisions of said statute 
with reference to discovery work is directly in-
volved in this case, and presented for determina-
tion on this appeal. The determination of this 
question will dispose of. the case, and we do not 
deem it material to consider or pass upon the 
many other questions discussed by counsel. In 
Colorado and several other states the work as 
specified in the Nevada statute is required to be 
performed as a prerequisite to the completion of 
a location. The same character of work is re-
quired in other states, but it is not made, in terms 
at least, necessary to complete a location, but 
rather, as we think, a condition to the continuance 
of the right acquired by location. We regard it 
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as entirely immaterial whether, under state legis-
lation in reference to discovery work, the per-
formance thereof be regarded as a necessary act 
of location, or as a condition to the continuance 
of the right after location. If such legislation is 
valid in the one case, it is in the other. * * *To 
enable a party to maintain a right to a mining 
claim after the right is acquired, it is necessary 
that the party continue substantially to comply, 
not only with the laws of Congress, but with the 
valid laws of the state and valid rules established 
by the miners, in force in the district where the 
claim is situated upon which such right depends. 
Failure to comply with such laws and rules works 
a forfeiture, whether the laws and rules provide 
for forfeiture for noncompliance or not, and the 
mining claim becomes subject to location by any 
qualified locator." (Sissons v. Sommers, 24 Nev. 
379, 55 P. 829) 
"If defendant's location was invalid because 
of the absence of a discovery cut, at the time 
plaintiff made peaceable entry, then the territory 
within the boundaries of defendant's claim was at 
the time open to location under the mining laws, 
and plaintiff could lawfully initiate his location 
within the boundaries of the Iva C. claim, irres-
pective of what his belief was as to territory being 
unoccupied and unappropriated (Lindley on 
Mines, vol. 1, Sec. 219); and, if the Iva C. location 
was invalid for such reason, it was immaterial to 
the validity of plaintiff's location that plaintiff 
knew that the claim of defendant had been sur-
veyed for patent, and the boundaries had been 
marked on the ground, and that the situs of the 
claim was known to him, and that the defendant 
had posted his patent plats and notices. If the 
location of defendant was invalid for the reasons 
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assigned, plaintiff was not a trespasser when he 
attempted to initiate his location therein. The 
jury ought to have been plainly told that, if 
defendant's claim was invalid for the reason 
assigned, the plaintiff could initiate his location 
within the boundaries of such claim." {Walsh v. 
Henry, 38 Colo. 393, 88 P. 449) 
"Taking advantage of the discretion accorded 
by the Federal statute, a number of states have 
supplemented the locational requisites herein-
before noticed by requiring the performance of a 
specified amount of development work within a 
prescribed period after the making of a discovery, 
such as the sinking of a shaft in such manner as to 
disclose the vein or crevice that carries the 
mineral. 
"I t is clear, of course, that the position of the 
discovery shaft is of no importance in jurisdic-
tions wherein the sinking of such a shaft is not 
demanded. And even where such a requirement is 
made a locational requisite, it seems that a shaft 
is not rendered ineffective by the circumstance 
that it extends a few inches over the boundary of 
an adjoining claim." {36 Am, Jur., Mines and 
Minerals, Sec. 88, p. 340) 
"There is no doubt that, if the locator dis-
covered a vein and filed proper notices on the 
Portlands on the unappropriated public domain, 
he was entitled to go on the ground and mark the 
boundaries, and in doing so float the locations and 
do the required work; but, if he never did any-
thing but post the notices, it would seem that no 
piece of ground was ever defined for segregation 
from the public domain, so as to notify or warn 
off others, or prevent the initiation of locations 
which would be good against a later one." {Nash 
v. McNamara, supra, at page 412) 
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In 7 L.R.A. (N. #.) , at page 839, may be found an 
annotation which makes the following statement: 
"Under the Federal mining laws, in the 
absence of state or local regulation, a location of 
a mining claim is complete upon proper discovery 
and marking the claim upon the ground. Nothing 
in the way of discovery or development work is 
required to complete i t ; and this applies to the 
existing conditions in California and Utah in 
which no such regulations have been adopted. In 
most of the other mining states and territories, 
however, Federal legislation on this subject has 
been supplemented by requirements for the per-
formance of certain work in the way of develop-
ment after discovery, which is a condition prece-
dent to the completion of the location. 
"These requirements Have usually taken the 
shape of a provision for the sinking of a discovery 
shaft upon the lode or vein discovered, or for an 
equivalent thereto." 
There is also contained in this annotation a reference 
to the decisions which hold that work in the way of sink-
ing a discovery shaft or the equivalent is required to be 
performed as a prerequisite to the completion of location 
and that a locator thus failing to comply with the statute 
cannot hold the claims as against a junior locator, and 
this is true whether the laws and rules provide for a for-
feiture for non-compliance or not. 
Section 4121, Compiled Laws of Nevada, 1929, 
specifically quoted above, requires the sinking of a dis-
covery shaft measuring 4 feet by 6 feet to a depth of at 
least 10 feet from the lowest part of the rim of such shaft 
at the surface, or deeper, if necessary to show by such 
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work a lode deposit of mineral in place. A cut or cross-
cut or a tunnel which cuts a lode at a depth of 10 feet or 
an open cut along the said ledge or lode equivalent in 
size to a shaft 4 feet by 6 feet by 10 feet deep is equi-
valent to a discovery shaft. This location work must be 
performed within ninety days from the date of posting 
the location notice. 
The evidence in this case without contradiction 
shows that no discovery shaft was sunk on the Kidder-
King claims, nor was any crosscut or tunnel excavated. 
Therefore, for this additional reason, on June 24, 1950, 
there had been no location of the Kidder-King claims, 
and as before stated, they were mere imaginings in the 
head of the promoter, Keynolds. 
The information as to the purported location of the 
Kidder-King claims came entirely from the mouth of 
Reynolds, and by his testimony he proved that the 
Kidder-King claims had no existence and were mere 
creations of his imagination. All that had been done was 
to post notices of location. Neither had the boundaries 
been marked so that they could be readily traceable on 
the ground, nor had the discovery work been done. The 
area covered by these purported claims was on June 24, 
1950, part of the public domain. The locators of these 
imaginary claims had no more interest in them than some 
stranger. They had no actual possession of the ground, 
and even as against a stranger they had no rights. Plain-
t iffs own proof, beyond a shadow of a doubt, showed 
that neither Kidder nor the plaintiff King had any title 
or ownership or any kind of interest in these supposed 
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and fictitious mining claims on the date they entered into 
the contract with the defendant, Hintze, and they were 
charged with knowledge of such fact. When they cove-
nanted and agreed to quit claim their right, title and 
interest in these claims, they were entering into an agree-
ment concerning non-existent property. 
Plaintiff and appellee attempted to explain the 
absence of the location work required by Sec. 4121, Com-
piled Laws of Nevada, 1929, by introducing evidence 
of alleged custom of the miners in the White Pine Min-
ing District with respect to the doing of this work (K. 
54, 55, 56). The witness Reynolds was asked whether he 
knew of the custom of the area with regard to the exten-
sion of time due to weather conditions within which to 
do the location work (R. 56). Sec. 4121 specifically re-
quires that this work be done within ninety days of the 
date of posting the location notices, and the authorities 
above cited indicate that such requirement is mandatory. 
The objection of defendant to this type of testimony (R. 
56) should have been sustained. If any custom existed, 
it could not excuse the non-execution of the location work 
in the face of the statutory requirement. 
II. 
THE CONTRACT DATED JUNE 24, 1950 BETWEEN 
KIDDER AND THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, KING, 
ON THE ONE PART AND THE DEFENDANT, HINTZE, 
ON THE OTHER PART, DEFINITELY IMPLIES THAT 
KIDDER AND KING HAD SOME RIGHT, TITLE, CLAIM 
AND INTEREST IN AND TO THE KIDDER-KING 
CLAIMS WHICH THEY WOULD CONVEY AND WHICH 
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WOULD PASS TO AND BECOME ASSETS OF THE 
CORPORATION TO BE FORMED BY DEFENDANT. 
1. A contract should receive a reasonable interpreta-
tion consistent with the purpose of the contract and 
intentions of the parties as expressed by the lan-
guage of the contract and as shown by the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances existing at the 
time the contract was executed. 
"The rules for construing agreements of pro-
moters do not differ from those that apply to 
other contracts. If such a contract is phrased in 
language of dubious meaning, it must be con-
strued and interpreted, like other contracts, in the 
light of the circumstances surrounding the pro-
moters, the objects they aimed to attain, and the 
results they contemplated." (13 Am. Jur., Corpo-
ration, Sec. 127, p. 266) 
u In the interpretation of an agreement, the 
surrounding circumstances at the time it was 
made should be considered for the purpose of 
ascertaining its meaning, but not for the purpose 
of adding a new and distinct undertaking. In 
interpreting an agreement, a court should, to the 
best of its ability, place itself in the situation 
occupied by the parties when the agreement was 
made and avail itself of the same light which the 
parties possessed when the agreement was made 
so as to judge of the meaning of the words and of 
the correct application of the language to the 
things described. * * *" (12 Am. Jur., Contracts, 
Sec. 247, p. 784) 
"If it were a contract between Par ry and a 
corporation, anticipated, but not yet in existence, 
there could be no recovery. If, on the other hand, 
it were a contract between individuals, there 
might be, if the testimony warranted i t ; and that 
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is the principal question argued here. It seems 
to be conceded — at least it is to us apparent — 
that the contract is confusing, and that, unless 
light may be thrown upon its meaning by sur-
rounding circumstances, the intention of the par-
ties in several important respects will remain in 
doubt. But, reading the instrument in the light 
of the situation of the parties at the time and of 
the object to be accomplished, we may be aided in 
reaching a satisfactory construction. How, then, 
were the parties situated, and what did they 
undertake to dof' (Mosier et al v. Parry, 60 Ohio 
St. 388, 54 N.E. 364, L.E.A. 1918E, 834) 
"One of the contentions is that parol evi-
dence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a writ-
ten instrument. It is assumed by defendant that 
the instrument in question is unambiguous and 
self-explanatory. If that were true, defendant's 
contention would be indisputable, but we have 
already determined that there is a latent ambig-
uity in the instrument as to whether or not it 
conveyed an exclusive permit to defendant or a 
right in common with other parties. This ambigu-
ity opened the door for the admission of evidence 
as to the understanding of the parties at the time 
the instrument was executed." (Boley v. Butter-
field, 57 Utah 262,194 P. 128,131) 
"Where the parol evidence offered does not 
tend to vary or contradict the terms of the writ-
ing, but merely to explain a latent ambiguity, we 
know of no respectable authority that holds it to 
be inadmissible." (Egelund v. Fayter, 51 Utah 
582,172 P. 313-14) 
"Where the language is mixed and susceptible 
of more than one construction, the court should 
attempt to place itself as nearly as possible in the 
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situation of the parties to the contract at the time 
the agreement was entered into, so that it may 
view the circumstances as viewed by the parties 
themselves to be enabled to understand the lan-
guage used in the sense with which the parties 
used it. In order to accomplish this purpose it is 
generally proper for the court to take notice of 
the surroundings and attendant circumstances and 
consider the language used in the light of such 
circumstances." (Read v. Forced Under firing Cor-
poration, 82 Utah 529, 26 P. (2d) 325-27) 
"While it is true that parol evidence may not 
be permitted to vary the terms of a written con-
tract, it is equally true that in construing a con-
tract all parts of it are to be considered, and the 
circumstances surrounding its making to be re-
garded, with a view of arriving at the true intent 
of the parties." (Mebius & Drescher Co. v. Mills, 
150 Cal. 229, 88 P. 917.) 
"It is elemental, in construing a contract, that 
its purpose, its nature, and subject matter should 
be considered. A construction giving an instru-
ment a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will 
be adopted when it can reasonably be done, and 
between two possible constructions that will be 
adopted which establishes a valid contract." 
(Schofield v. Z.C.M.L, 85 Utah 281, 39 P. (2d) 
342, 96 A. L.R. 1089.) 
The foregoing authorities teach that in determining 
the intentions of the parties to a written contract, the 
court is first charged with the duty of examining the 
language actually used in the contract, and if there exists 
an ambiguity therein, it may resort to the surrounding 
facts and circumstances as an aid to its interpretation 
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of the agreement. These rules of interpretation are of 
peculiar application to the contract involved in this 
action, inasmuch as it reveals upon its face a definite 
ambiguity which, in order to clarify it, requires the 
assistance of parol evidence. 
The contract is a typical promotion contract between 
parties who mutually agree to furnish properties for 
the organization of a mining corporation. Upon the 
security of these properties, shares of stock were to be 
issued. Kidder and King were to receive a specified 
number of shares of stock for the assignment of the 
Isaacs lease and option and the conveyance to Hintze, 
or the company to be organized by him, of the Kidder-
King claims. Hintze, on the other hand, was to receive 
a specified number of shares of stock of the new corpo-
ration for his services in organizing the new company, 
and also in consideration of the quit claiming by him to 
the company of "all his right, title and interest in and 
to" 12 certain unpatented lode mining claims. This con-
tract certainly contemplated that assets and properties 
would be conveyed to the new corporation which had 
actual existence, both factually and legally. 
One of the pertinent covenants made by Kidder and 
King reads as follows: 
"The said Edwin G. Kidder and Vera S. 
King hereby agree to execute and deliver to F. F. 
Hintze or to the company to be organized by him 
a quit claim deed or deeds conveying all of their 
right, title and interest in and to the following 
named unpatented lode mining claims situated in 
Sections 24, 25, 30, 31 and 36, Township 16 North, 
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Eanges 57 and 58 East, in White Pine County, 
State of Nevada, to-wit;" (Here follows a specific 
description of the claims.) 
By a further provision of the contract Kidder and 
King warranted that there were no outstanding debts or 
liens against "the said property" and their mining lease 
and option (meaning the Isaacs lease and option) and 
that the same were free and clear of debts and claims of 
any and all kinds, and should any claims arise out of 
their operations of said claims in the past, they agreed 
to hold said assignee free and harmless from all liabili-
ties and expenses of any litigation that might arise out 
of any such debts and/or claims. 
The agreement on its face clearly designates it as 
a promotion agreement, having for its ultimate purpose 
the organization of a mining corporation to take, hold 
and operate the Isaacs lease and option and also the 
unpatented lode mining claims which the respective par-
ties agreed to quit claim to the new corporation. The 
question arises as to whether or not the requirements of 
this contract would be satisfied merely by the parties 
executing quit claim deeds to the corporation whereby 
the right, title and interest of the grantors, whatever 
they may be, were conveyed, or whether by the contract 
the parties intended that Kidder and King on the one 
hand, and Hintze on the other ,should convey to the 
corporation unpatented mining claims which had actual 
legal existence. The uncertainty of the contract in this 
regard opens the door for the consideration of all evi-
dence and circumstances surrounding this transaction. 
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2. A provision in a corporate promotion agreement 
that a party will convey his right, title, claim and 
interest in and to land or other property by quit 
claim deed unto the corporation to be organized 
under the agreement does not absolve him from all 
liability or responsibility except the execution and 
delivery of such quit claim deed and does not operate 
as a reservation of immunity on his part, while the 
contract remains executory, from all liability for his 
reservation of immunity on his part, while the con-
tract remains executory, from all liability for his 
want of title to the land or other property, where the 
contract itself and surrounding facts and circum-
stances show that the parties intended the contract 
to be based on the premise that the party did in 
fact own a substantial title, right or interest in and 
to the property to be conveyed to the proposed 
corporation. 
"A provision in a contract for the sale of land 
that the vendor shall give a quitclaim deed or 
other conveyance of less worth than a general 
warranty deed does not necessarily absolve him 
from any obligation other than the execution of 
such a deed, and operate as a reservation or 
immunity on his part, while the contract remains 
executory, from all liability for his want of title. 
That the purchaser has agreed to take a deed 
without warranty is not necessarily a waiver of 
the right to demand a clear title; on the con-
trary, the fact that a warranty in the conveyance 
is waived has been said to be all the stronger 
reason why he should insist on the cancelation of 
all liens and encumbrances, since he will have no 
warranty to fall back on if the title should prove 
to be defective. Even though the contract merely 
calls for a conveyance of the vendor's right, title 
and interest in the land, other provisions may so 
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indicate the character of title called for as to re-
quire the character of title so indicated. In a case 
in which the court stated that a grantee in a quit-
claim deed has the same rights as a grantee in a 
deed of general warranty where the deed purports 
on its face to convey the land, a contract was held 
to show an intent to sell a good title and to require 
such a title where the first part of the contract 
was in the ordinary form of a contract for the sale 
and conveyance of the land although the contract 
subsequently provided for the giving of a quit-
claim deed upon the full payment of the purchase 
price and 'upon surrender' of the contract. It has 
also been held that where the agreement is for a 
deed without warranty of all the vendor's 'right, 
title and interest' in certain land, the vendor is 
bound to show that he has some right, title or 
interest which he can convey. Such an agreement 
implies that the vendor has some right, title or 
interest which will pass by a conveyance, and if 
he has none the stipulation on his part is a nullity 
and the contract will be rescinded at the instance 
of the purchaser." (55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Pur-
chaser, Sec. 160, p. 630) 
"But is seems that, even though the contract 
merely calls for a conveyance of the vendor's 
right, title and interest in the land, other pro-
visions may so indicate the character of the title 
the vendor is to convey as to control. * * * But it 
seems that, regardless of protective provisions 
inserted in behalf of the vendor, he cannot suc-
cessfully invoke the aid of equity to require the 
vendee to accept a conveyance of land, where he 
has no title whatever thereto." (57 A. L. R., 1280-
81) 
"An agreement to convey by quitclaim deed 
does not require the vendor to convey a good 
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title, unless the contract shows that the parties 
intended to contract for the land and not merely 
for the vendor's interest, whatever it might be. 
But a contract to deliver a good and sufficient 
deed is breached where the vendor without title 
tenders a quitclaim deed sufficient in form; al-
though under a contract for a good title, a quit-
claim deed is sufficient, if the grantor has the 
title.' (66 C. J., Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 522, 
p. 851) 
"Bespondent undertook to buy something 
more than a chance title. This the contract shows. 
To segregate the words 'a quitclaim deed to said 
premises,' and hold her to the legal import of 
those words, without reference to their relation 
to other words and covenants in the contract, 
would be an injustice to the buyer and do violence 
to accepted rules of construction. If a party 
agrees to sell land, it is in legal effect an agree-
ment to sell a title to the land. In the absence of 
a stipulation to the contrary, the law implies an 
undertaking on the part of the vendor to make a 
good title. 29 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 606; Ankeny 
v. Clark, 1 Wash. 549, 20 Pac. 583; 2 Warvelle 
on Vendors (2d ed.) 836. The form of conveyance 
is a secondary consideration. There may be rea-
sons for giving or receiving a quitclaim deed. 
These will not be inquired into so long as that 
form of deed will convey the title agreed to be 
conveyed, in the contract itself. 
"'* *
 #THe impression prevails to some extent 
that an agreement to sell lands by quitclaim deed 
or other conveyance of less worth than a warranty 
deed absolves the vendor from any obligation 
other than the execution and delivery of his deed; 
that it is a reservation of immunity on his part 
from all liability in damages for a breach of his 
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contract or failure of title. This is erroneous. The 
effect of a quitclaim deed was considered in the 
case of Ankeny v. Clark, 1 Wash. 549, 20 Pac. 
583, where, after some discussion, the court said: 
«• * • Under the statutes of our territory, a quit-
claim deed is just as effectual to convey the title 
to real estate as any other form of deed, and a 
grantee in a quitclaim deed is entitled to the same 
presumptions as to bona fides, and has the same 
rights, as a grantee in a deed of general warranty. 
This is undoubtedly true of a quitclaim deed 
which purports on its fact to convey, not merely 
an interest, but the real estate itself.'" (Davis v. 
Lee, 52 Wash. 330,100 P. 753) 
When the court places itself in the position of the 
parties to the contract, it will quickly sense the fact that 
they were clearly acting on the premise that Kidder and 
King actually held legal ownership of the Kidder-King 
unpatented mining claims and that the status of the 
title of those claims was such that Kidder and King and 
the corporation could assert it successfully against the 
whole world. There is not a suggestion on the face of 
the contract nor in the testimony at the trial that the 
parties contemplated any other ownership by Kidder 
and King than an absolute one which would stand 
inviolate against the intrusion on the properties by 
others. The fact that these claims were to form part of 
the underlying assets of the corporation to be formed 
by the defendant is certainly indicative that the parties 
themselves intended that that corporation would have an 
ownership in the claims which it could assert against 
trespassers or claim jumpers. The above cited authori-
ties show that the covenant upon the part of Kidder and 
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King to execute and deliver a quit claim deed conveying 
their right, title and interest in the Kidder-King claims 
was not performed by a simple execution of the deed. 
Their undertaking carried the definite and explicit impli-
cation that Kidder and King had some kind of sub-
stantial ownership in the claims. The following quota-
tion from Johnson v. Tool, 1 Dana (Ky.) 479, 25 Am. D. 
162, is much in point: 
"An undertaking to convey all the vendor's 
'right, title and interest,' but without general 
warranty, implies that he has some right, title and 
interest which can constitute the subject of a con-
tract, and which can pass by the conveyance to 
the vendee. If the vendor has no 'right, title or 
interest,' the stipulation on his part amounts to a 
nullity. It cannot be presumed, that a vendee 
would ever engage to pay money for nothing. 
We are, therefore, of opinion, that it was incum-
bent on the vendor to exhibit a title, and shew 
himself able to make it to the vendee. We do not 
mean that the vendor was bound to shew the best 
title, nor even a title regularly derived from the 
commonwealth. But we thing he was bound to 
present such a state of case as would show that 
he at least had some right. A naked possession 
might be such a right as would, if transferred and 
conveyed, satisfy the covenant on his part. But 
the vendor has not shewn that much." 
Paraphrasing this excerpt, it cannot be supposed 
that Hintze would have undertaken the obligation to 
organize a corporation and to convey his unpatented 
claims to it on the mere promise of Kidder and King to 
convey whatever interest they might have in and to the 
Kidder-King claims. Rather, the conclusion is that the 
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covenants of Kidder and King required them to convey 
to Hintze or to the corporation a substantial title or 
interest in and to the Kidder-King claims. 
Any other interpretation of the contract than that 
above urged immediately suggests inimical complications 
to the existence and well-being of the corporation. The 
evidence in the case clearly shows that Kidder and King 
and their representative Keynolds contemplated that 
shares of stock of this corporation would be sold to the 
public. This would, of course, require a qualification 
under the "Blue Sky Law" (7U.C. A. 1953, Sec. 6-1-1 to 
6-1-41). It is difficult to imagine that the Securities 
Commission would grant a license to sell shares of the 
stock of this corporation upon showing of the status of 
the title to the Kidder-King claims. As hereinbefore 
demonstrated, these claims did not exist, and neither 
Kidder nor King had any ' right, title or interest" in and 
to any such claims as described. They could not own any 
interest or title in something that did not exist. Hence, 
their covenant to convey to the corporation or to Hintze 
their right, title and interest, was breached. 
III. 
THE INABILITY OF KIDDER AND THE PLAINTIFF 
AND APPELLEE KING TO CONVEY TO THE DEFEND-
ANT, OR TO THE CORPORATION TO BE ORGANIZED 
BY HIM, SOME SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OR INTEREST 
IN THE KIDDER- KING CLAIMS CONSTITUED A 
BREACH OF THE PROMOTION CONTRACT OF SUCH 
NATURE AS TO DEFEAT ITS PURPOSE AND RELIEVE 
AND DISCHARGE THE DEFENDANT AND APPEL-
LANT HINTZE FROM THE DUTY OF ORGANIZING THE 
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CORPORATION CONTEMPLATED BY THE PROMOTION 
AGREEMENT. 
1. A breach by one party that goes to the essence or 
root of the contract justifies a refusal of the other 
party to perform his promise and discharges his 
obligation to perform, even though there has been 
a partial performance on the part of the first party. 
"Where promises which form the considera-
tion for each other are concurrent or dependent, 
the failure of one party to perform will discharge 
the other, and one cannot maintain an action 
against the other without showing performance, 
or a tender of performance, on his part, unless 
such performance has been excused, the general 
rule being that a person who has himself broken 
a contract cannot recover on it. Where acts are 
to be performed by each party at the same time, 
neither party can maintain an action against the 
other without performance, or tender of perform-
ance, on his part. So where a party sues on a 
special contract to recover compensation due on 
its performance, he must show performance on 
his part or a lec^al excuse." (13 Corpus Juris, 
Contracts, Sec. 694, p. 627-9) 
<<* * * Where there has been part performance 
[of a contract] and there is a breach of a promise 
which goes to only a part of the consideration and 
the breach may be compensated for in damages, 
the breach does not relieve the other party from 
his obligation to perform his promise. In order to 
operate as a discharge, the partial failure to per-
form must go to the very root of the contract. 
But a breach that goes to the essence of the con-
tract justifies a refusal of the other party to per-
form his promise or discharges his obligation to 
perform, even though there has been part per-
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formance. In other words, a breach of a promise 
which goes to the whole consideration gives to the 
injured party the right to treat the entire con-
tract as broken. Where the failure to perform 
par t of a contract is in regard to matters which 
would render the performance of the rest a thing 
different in substance from what was contracted 
for, the party not in default may abandon the con-
tract. A plaintiff who has committed a substantial 
breach cannot recover where the promises are 
dependent. I t may be observed that where there 
is such a material breach, the plaintiff has not 
substantially performed." (12 Am. Jur., Con-
tracts, Sec. 343, p. 901) 
"When the failure to perform the contract is 
in respect to matters which would render the per-
formance of the rest a thing different in sub-
stance from what was contracted for, so far as we 
are advised the authorities all agree that the 
party not in default may abandon the contract." 
{Balance v. Van Uxem, 191 111. 319, 61 N.E. 85) 
"A substantial failure of consideration is a 
ground for rescission." (Larson v. Thomas, 
S. D , 215 N.W. 927, 57 A.L.R. 1246-1250) 
"The maxim, 4De minimis non curat lex,' does 
not apply in such a case. That maxim can only 
apply to imperfections in title so slight that the 
court can say of them the parties to the action 
did not have such defects in contemplation, and, 
if they had, they would have disregarded them. 
It may be that the plaintiffs intended to lay out 
the farm in a high-class residence district. In 
fact, something of the kind may be inferred from 
the evidence. The title search brought to the 
plaintiffs' knowledge the recorded grant made by 
Requa of a perpetual easement to construct and 
maintain over the farm a line of telegraph and 
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telephone poles and wires. That may have been 
a very objectionable incumbrance in the eyes of 
the plaintiffs, and I think it would be a very 
startling proposition for the court to say that it 
was a defect in title which may be disregarded in 
! this action at law." (Fossume v. Requa, 218 N. Y. 
| 339,113 N. E. 330-332) 
"The necessity of surfacing the streets in the 
subdivision, in order to improve the premises, is 
apparent, and in so far as defendant's rights are 
concerned, the surfacing of the entire street upon 
which his lot abutted was of paramount impor-
tance to him. The putting in of watermains, side-
walks, and sewers was of little avail, if the street 
remained unsurfaced so that he and others might 
not have a convenient way to and from his prop-
erty. Merely to have surfaced the street in front 
of the one lot would be absurd. We think that the 
noncompliance by plaintiff in this respect amounts 
to a substantial and material breach of the cove-
nant to improve. 
"The plaintiff and his assignors, therefore, 
being guilty of a substantial breach of a depend-
ant covenant, cannot maintain this action." (Pcdmr-
er v. Fox, 274 Mich. 252, 264 N. W. 361, 104 A. 
L. E. 1057-1061) 
See also Braseth v. State Bank of Edinburg, 
N.D , 98 N.W. 79; Southern Colonization Co. v. 
Derfler, Fla , 75 So. 790, L. R. A. 1917F, 744; 
Weathered v. Weathered, 115 Kan. 744, 224 P. 901. 
"Failure of consideration is the failure to 
execute a promise, the performance of which has 
been exchanged for performance by the other 
party. Among other situations, the failure may 
arise from the wilful breach of the promise. And 
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in a bilateral contract, such failure of considera-
tion is a defense to an action for a breach of the 
contract inasmuch as it is contemplated that the 
performance of the unilateral promises shall be 
in exchange for each other, the performance being 
considered as equivalent in value." (Bliss v. Cali-
fornia Co-op Producers, 30 Cal. 2d (Adv. 237) 181 
P. 2d 369,170 A.L.E. 1009-16) 
"It does not follow that because a technical 
rescission has not been made, and cannot be made, 
that a defendant cannot avail himself of the de-
fense of failure or want of consideration. For 
practical purposes, there is no difference in the 
effect upon the agreement between the successful 
defense of want or total failure of consideration 
and the successful termination of an action to 
rescind it. In either case, the agreement is ren-
dered incapable of enforcement, the judgment 
being a bar to any future action, so far at least 
as parties to the action, or those concluded by it, 
are concerned." (12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Sec. 359, 
p. 926) 
"In other words, the stipulations were de-
pendent, in which case the failure of one party to 
perform will discharge the other, and one cannot 
maintain an action against the other without 
showing performance or a tender of performance 
on his part unless such performance has been 
excused." (Slaughter v. Barnett, 114 Fla. 352, 154 
So. 134,102 A. L. R. 1073-1079) 
2. A plaintiff must allege and prove performance of 
the contractual obligations assumed by him in order 
to maintain an action against the defendant for a 
breach of the contract. 
"Having pleaded a fulfillment of all of the 
terms and conditions imposed upon him by the 
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,. contract, plaintiff failed in the proof. * * * The 
plaintiff having failed to prove his performance 
of the contract, he cannot recover damages from 
the defendant." (Niederhauser v. Jackson Dairy 
Co., (Iowa) 237 N. W. 222-224) 
"Plaintiff, having pleaded full performance 
of the contract, could not recover without estab-
lishing that fact. * * * The plaintiff, therefore, 
having alleged performance, was bound to estab-
lish that fact, and failing to do so, no recovery 
could be had." {Stem v. McKee, 70 App. Div. 142 
(N .Y . ) ,75N.Y. S.157) 
"I t is the settled law of this state before 
recovery can be had upon a contract, that plaintiff 
must show either that he substantially performed 
or tendered performance of the conditions on his 
part to be performed." (Thomas v. Matthews, 
Ohio St , 113 N. E. 699, L. E. A. 1917A, 
1068-1074) 
"Where the promises or covenants in an 
agreement are mutual and dependent or concur-
rent, plaintiff must aver performance, or at least 
an offer to perform on his part, or a legal excuse 
for non-performance." (13 Corpus Juris, Con^ 
tracts, Sec, 848, p. 725) 
I t has been demonstrated that Kidder and King, on 
June 24, 1950, had no title to the Kidder-King claims, 
nor any other right or interest in these alleged claims. 
Although approximately nine months prior to that date 
they had caused to be erected location notices on a cer-
tain part of the public domain, they had utterly failed 
to comply with the requirements of both the Federal and 
Nevada statutes to perfect the title to these claims. Their 
failure to mark the claims on the grounds so that their 
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boundaries could be readily traced, and their failure to 
excavate the location shaft totally destroyed the inchoate 
rights created by the posting of the location notices. Over 
six months had elapsed since the location notices were 
posted, and inasmuch as the marking of the boundaries 
and the digging of the discovery shaft were mandatory 
requirements of law, the failure to comply with such 
mandates within the time specified in the statutes termi-
nated all right, title and interest of Kidder and King 
in and to these putative claims long prior to June 24, 
1950. The evidence shows beyond contradiction that on 
June 24, 1950 neither Kidder nor King nor any of their 
agents or representatives held actual possession or occu-
pancy of the ground upon which an attempt had been 
made to locate these claims. Hence, Kidder and King 
did not hold the color of even a possessory right in the 
putative claims. 
Kidder and King breached the covenant of their 
contract whereby they agreed to convey to the defendant, 
or to the corporation to be organized by him, their right, 
title, claim and interest in and to these putative claims, 
because they held no right, title, interest, claim or posses-
sion in and to said putative claims. Such breach went to 
the heart of the contract. It is true that Kidder and King 
assigned to the defendant and appellant the Isaacs lease 
and option covering other properties, but the properties 
•contained within the lease and option were only a part 
of the assets which were to be owned and held by the 
intended corporation. 
Reynolds' testimony demonstrates that the Kidder-
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King claims surrounded the properties described in the 
Isaacs lease, and according to his testimony they 
afforded substantial protection to the Isaacs properties 
and at the same time possessed intrinsic value. The par-
ties to the agreement did not intend that the Isaacs lease 
and option should be the only asset of the corporation. 
They intended that the assets of the corporation should 
consist of the Isaacs lease and option, the Kidder-King 
claims, and the Hintze claims. A corporation whose 
assets do not include the Kidder-King claims would not 
be the same corporation as that contemplated by the 
parties to the agreement. Such a corporation would be 
an entirely different entity from one that owned and 
possessed the Isaacs lease and option, the Kidder-King 
claims and the Hintze claims — all of which would have 
formed an operating unit. The assertion that Kidder 
and King substantially performed their agreement by 
assigning the Isaacs lease and option does violence to 
the contract and imposes on the defendant the acceptance 
of a corporation entirely different from that contem-
plated by the parties. 
The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she and 
Kidder had fully performed all of the obligations im-
posed upon them by the contract (R. 1). This allegation 
recognizes the rule of law above stated that a plaintiff 
must allege the performance of the contractural obliga-
tions assumed by him in order to maintain an action 
against a defendant for breach of the contract, He must 
do something more than this: He must prove such allega-
tion. In this case the plaintiff utterly failed to prove 
that Kidder and King had performed their part of the 
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contract. Rather, plaintiff's own proof showed that she 
and Kidder had breached the contract in a material, sub-
stantial manner and that such breach was in the form of 
a failure of consideration, which went to the root of the 
agreement. Under such circumstances the trial court 
committed highly prejudicial error in instructing the 
jury that the defendant had failed to present a defense 
to plaintiff's cause of action. It was a grievous error, 
which permeated the jury's verdict. I t is submitted that 
the defendant's and appellant's motion for dismissal and 
non-suit (R. 248) and his motion for judgment notwith-
standing verdict (R. 286) should have been granted, and 
that the trial court committed reversible error in its 
Instruction No. 1, wherein it was declared that the 
defendant had presented no evidence which would amount 
to a defense of plaintiff's cause of action and instruc-
ting the jury as a matter of law that the defendant had 
breached the contract as claimed by the plaintiff, and 
that plaintiff was entitled, therefore, to nominal damages 
(R. 270-271). 
WHEREFORE, defendant and appellant prays that 
the Supreme Court will set aside the judgment against 
him in favor of plaintiff, and that it order and direct 
the trial court to dismiss this action against defendant 
with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER, 
FRED L. FINLINSON 
H. J. HINTZE 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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Received two copies of the foregoing Brief of Apel-
lant this day of December, 1953. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee 
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